207
The Economic Analysis of Law, or the Law and Economics movement, will soon celebrate half a century. In recent decades it has been emerging as the dominant theoretical paradigm and scientific methodology for legal academia, 1 and it is gradually capturing various segments of policy and law making by legislatures and courts, and of the legal practice as well.
2 Law and Economics was also acknowledged lately as a sub-field of the science of economics with the decision by the Journal of Economic Literature in 1993 to classify it as an official field of economics, and some argue that law has become one of the most important areas of applied economics. Although for three decades Law and Economics prospered mainly in North America, in recent decades it has rapidly expanded also in Europe and elsewhere. 4 For most students of law the Economic Analysis of Law needs no introduction (a fact which itself may indicate the dominance of Law and Economics). 5 This short essay, therefore, focuses not on the content of Law and Economics but on its context. Section 1 will locate Law and Economics within a grand map of legal theories, adopting Thomas Kuhn's theory of the evolution of science. Section 2 will offer a very broad definition of Law and Economics, which also corresponds to the rationale of this volume: examining various contemporary research methods in legal research. Section 3 will point to several shortcomings in most contemporary Law and Economics literature, and to the need for changes in other areas to adapt Law and Economics to the 21 st century. Section 4 will conclude.
The Historical Roots of Law and Economics
Legal research and the methodology employed to analyze and evaluate the law are conducted within paradigmatic thinking. The term "paradigm shift" was coined by
Thomas Kuhn when he put forward a theory about the development of the natural sciences. 6 Kuhn disputed the modernistic description of Frances Bacon, who presented scientific inquiry as one of constant and cumulative progress, like a building, which is constructed stone after stone. Kuhn argued that science develops in leaps. Regular scientific research is conducted within a set of boundaries based on presuppositions left unquestioned by the contemporary scientific community. These boundaries were dubbed by Kuhn a paradigm. Scientists in their research (and in their research agenda) are trying to complete a jigsaw puzzle, where the framework of the puzzle is predetermined by the paradigm. However, in the course of scientific research it turns out that not all pieces fit their spots, and some pieces tend to cross the set boundaries.
Scientists try to force the pieces into the spaces they think are meant for them. But at one focal point the framework collapses. Doubts bring about rethinking of the preset presuppositions. The paradigm shifts; a new paradigm is constructed, which sets new presuppositions and a new research agenda. Regular scientific research continues within the new paradigm, until that too is ripe for replacement.
Kuhn's analysis can be applied to our thinking about the law and the methodology of legal research. One qualification might be in place: in the social sciences and the law different paradigms can coexist in parallel. However, one could argue that this is the case also with regard to the natural sciences, so no real difference vis-a-vis the development of knowledge exists between the different spheres of human inquiry.
Be that as it may, Law and Economics is the current dominant paradigm for legal research. 7 This statement reflects not only the increasing share of Law and Economics papers in law journals and other journals, but also the fact the Law and Economic jargon and thinking are present in many other law articles and books, which are not strictly Law and Economics works. 8 The economic analysis of law also affects legal researchers who do not belong the Law and Economics crowd, and it infiltrates judicial decision-making and policy makers' modes of thinking and reasoning too. th century the formalist approach to law, which was based on Legal Positivism, prospered. It portrayed the law as a set of coherent rules, which are clear-cut, predictable or foreseeable, and readily available. Facts were perceived as something that can be verified objectively. The legal process, therefore, was portrayed as a routine application of the law to a set of facts, and therefore, save in cases of bad judges, every reasonable judge could derive from this process the "correct" decision.
Law was perceived as a closed science, and legal research was conducted in the framework of "pure" legal doctrines. The approach to law and legal research became dogmatic, and normative analysis of law was expelled from law schools. One of their main insights portrays the law as a tool of dominant groups for control of other groups in society and as a tool of Western Liberalism to maintain its ideological, economic and political hegemony.
The Law and Economics movement is another offspring of Legal Realism. Indeed, it can be seen as a direct response to the Realists' calls for help of the social sciences in analyzing the law and legal institutions. It emerged as a parallel response to the Realist challenge and is perceived, at least in the American academic context, as a rival response to the CLS. While the CLS challenges the Liberal foundations of law, the Law and Economics movement operates within these foundations. While the CLS is associated with the political left, Law and Economics is associated with the political right. In many American Law Schools these two movements became a source for academic and political rivalry. As will be elaborated later, I do not share this political categorization. Law and Economics as a methodology is not necessarily a right-wing movement and I believe that there are many common insights of the two movements, certainly when compared to traditional "black letter" doctrine and formalist legal thinking. It is true, though, that in the American context Law and Economics was captured by the political right, a point of criticism on which I will elaborate below.
Be that as it may, the nature of the relationship between these two offspring of Legal Realism is less relevant today, because in recent years we have witnessed a significant decline of CLS, along with further expansion of Law and Economics, in both the subject areas it addresses and the methodological tools it employs. While in the past the association of Law and Economics with the political right and Capitalist or Libertarian economic thinking, which favors free markets and is against central intervention, might have been convincing, today the Law and Economic world is much more diverse. European input into this movement, Institutional Law and Economics, Behavioral Law and Economics and other sub-fields, broaden this paradigm and foster much more diversity in terms of ideologies and public policies.
While Critical Legal Studies and also Legal Realism have not become transformed into a dominant paradigm in legal research, one can talk today about Law and Economics as a dominant paradigm in the study and analysis of law, and it is becoming less and less associated solely with a specific political or ideological agenda. Whether the directions of the contemporary developments of Law and Economics can still be regarded as within the same paradigm, or whether we are witnessing a paradigmatic shift, will remain an open question here, 9 but an answer to this question calls for a definition of Law and Economics, which leads us to the next section.
of the science of economics, Adam Smith, dealt with much broader issues. His analysis of the economic world was intertwined with insights into politics and culture, political theory and moral philosophy. Only subsequently did economistsfirst the Classical theorists and then the Neo-classicists -narrow down their interests and focus only on pure economic markets. This was partly the result of the development of more rigorous methodology and graphic models, especially by the Neo-classicists in the 19 th century, with the addition of advanced mathematics in the 20 th century.
However, in recent decades we have witnessed the re-broadening of economics to encompass analyses of areas outside the traditional economic markets. Politics, international relations and other types of collective decision-making are some of these new frontiers. This imperialism of economics has also reached the law -with the Law and Economics movement. In this sense, Law and Economics has an interesting common feature with Critical Legal Studies. This rival movement can also be seen as part of a broader context of the Deconstruction and Post-modern paradigms originating in the Humanities. Law and Economics and CLS are fresh attempts to return to a grand theory, abolishing the 19 th century emergence of the social sciences, their division into sub-fields, each with its distinct object of research and scientific methodology, and the general division between the social sciences, the humanities, and even the exact sciences.
10 Law is one of the fields in which theses two grand theories collide.
The expansive course of economics can be demonstrated by its changing definitions by key economics scholars. The famous Neo-classical economist, Alfred Marshall, who invented the demand and supply curves, defined economics as "A study of man's action in the ordinary business of life; it inquires how he gets his income and how he uses it".
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George Stigler, a contemporary economist, defined it as "Study of the operation of economic organizations, and economic organizations are social (and rarely individual) arrangements to deal with the production and distribution of economic goods and services".
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These two definitions are narrow and focus on the traditional economic market.
But already in 1932 economics was defined more broadly by the Lionel Robbins as "the science which studies human behavior as the relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses". 13 This definition broadened economics to deal with every human or social choice in conditions of scarcity; and indeed, in recent years we have come to view as part of economics such fields as game theory and public and social choice, which do not necessarily focus only on human behavior in traditional economic markets. According to Robbins, every human activity has an economic aspect.
14 But maybe even Robbins' definition is not wide enough to cover all that is being done today under the roof of economics. In a sense, Law and Economics believes not only that every human activity has an economic aspects, but that the economic aspects (broadly defined) can be presented as the sole or exclusive aspects of human activity.
A possibly broader and more accurate modern definition of economics focuses not on the subject matter of economics but on its scientific methodology. 15 According to this suggested definition economics studies human behavior in a set situation by (1) transforming the complex reality to simplified reality, using simplifying assumptions, (2) operating a rigorous (mathematical of graphic) model on this simplified reality, (3) deriving conclusions as to the model's variables and the causal connections between them, and (4) transforming these "laboratory" results into statements and policies concerning the real world.
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The soft points of this methodology are the first and last stages -the assumptions stage and the real-world policy conclusions. One of the major points of criticism against the economic approach in general, and against the economic approach to law in particular, is that the economic models never faithfully represent reality. This criticism is not justified because the economic models do not pretend to represent reality as it is.
One has to remember that even the most basic and simple model of a first-year MicroEconomics course -studying the connections of price, supply and demand of a simple product -is based on simplifying assumptions such as set tastes, set prices of other products, etc. That said, the question (on which I will elaborate later) remains as to whether the canonic models of the Economic Analysis of Law focus on the important aspects of human behavior vis-a-vis the law, 17 or whether the choice of the simplifying assumptions by Law and Economics mainstream literature are neutral or biased.
The advantage of economic models dealing with traditional economic markets is that their underlying assumptions are less controversial or are more faithful to reality, as it is transformed to the model. One of the key assumptions that characterize most economic models is rational behavior. Homo economicus behaves rationally when his decisions are geared to maximize his welfare (or utility or wellbeing). He has a set order of preferences, and he makes his choices on the basis of information. The rationality and self-maximization assumptions are less controversial when we analyze activity within the pure economic market, for example, individual decision-making with regard to methods of investing his money or whether to purchase a certain product or service. When we operate in the stock market we usually aim to make more money.
Rationality is thus transgressed to maximization of wealth. But when we leave the core economic sphere this assumption, or at least its application to particular modes of decisions, becomes more controversial. How can we translate rational behavior in the context of a decision whether to get married, to enlarge one's family, to adopt a child, to commit a crime, to vote in the elections, etc. Unlike the stock market example, here we will not necessarily assume that wellbeing or utility maximization equals wealth maximization, although we can still assume that the decision maker acts to satisfy his or her order of preferences.
It ought to be noted that according to the broad definition of economics the rationality assumption is not an integral and indispensable part of economic analysis.
It still dominates the work done in this field, but the new sub-branch of economics -behavioral economics -focuses on relaxing the pure, or narrow, rationality assumption, and in theory economic models can offer analyses based on the assumption that individuals are not rational or are only partly rational, or that their operation is motivated by deontological moral perceptions.
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What are the advantages of the economic methodology? One main advantage is that it is scientifically evolutionary: a simple model based on far reaching simplifying assumptions can be constructed, and gradually developed by relaxation or complication of some of these assumptions. Another advantage of economic thinking is that such a methodology provides us with a common language for discussion, and the debates on the subject matter of the analysis can focus on the model and its mathematical validity, on the policy conclusions from the model regarding the real world, and indeed on the simplifying assumptions. As a result from this debate we can improve the assumptions or the mathematical modeling or the policy conclusions regarding the real world. 19 Other scientific approaches used in legal discourse and research also have a common language, but the terms of the economic science are much more precise and agreed.
Thus, wealth, or transitivity, or rent or monopolistic and competitive price have a broader common understanding, even among non-economists, than reasonableness, or good faith (vis-a-vis black letter or doctrinal analysis), or hegemony, or socialization (vis-a-vis sociological discourse).
Yet a further advantage of the economic methodology when applied to legal questions is that it easily crosses geographical borders and different legal systems and cultures. When using doctrinal analysis the scholar is usually bound to her legal system of legal family, while an economic analysis is more detached from the local specifics and thus facilitates an easier import and export of ideas and a real global discussion of various legal issues. This advantage itself is an explanatory factor for the success of Law and Economics, as it makes it easier for scholars to publish internationally, for example, for non-American scholars to publish in the USA. 20 Economics, therefore, offers us not only a better tool for deliberation (we can agree on the exact points we disagree on), it is also an evolutionary study: the models can be constantly improved and made more sophisticated. This methodology, however, creates specific problems when applied to legal research, on which I will elaborate in section 3.
Economic Analysis of Law
The intersection between law and economics is not a new phenomenon. does not focus only on legal analysis of the economic world, but also on the economic analysis of the legal world. It is not limited to the branches of the law dealing with economic issues but views the whole legal system -private law as well as public law, substantive law as well as procedural law, and also legal institutions -as targets for economic analysis.
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The roots of the new Law and Economics can be found in the 18th century with the writings of Smith, 22 Beccaria, 23 Condorcet, 24 and Bentham. 25 In our times it emerged as a significant branch in legal theory only in the 1960s, with a famous article by The (modern) economic approach to law extends the traditional economic models, designed to analyze traditional markets, and applies them to non-economic markets, such as the market of crimes, the market of conflict resolution, the market of innovation, etc. It also emphasizes the role of law and legal institutions in economic and non-economic markets. In performing these tasks the economic analysis of law has also shifted traditional economic analysis to put more weight on normative analysis, pointing to the desirable legal rules and institutions to achieve certain goals (such as efficiency), a phenomenon on which I will elaborate below. To perform a normative analysis one has to define a normative objective, the source of which is outside the scope of the science of economics. In this sense, and in the framework of our broad definition of "economics", the normative goal can be considered as one of the simplifying assumptions within the economic methodology.
The leading normative goal of most economic analysis literature is efficiency.
However, several competing definitions of efficiency exist: maximization of utility, maximization of wealth, Pareto optimality; 35 competing views also exist about the goal of efficiency: if it is the primary normative goal, as advocated by Posner, 36 or if it is second-best to utility maximization, unattainable due to measurement problems, as advocated by Welfare Economics. In addition, efficiency is not necessarily an exclusive normative goal. Any teleological principle, including distributional principles (e.g. Rawls' theory of justice), can be set as the normative goal of economic analysis.
A major part of constitutional law and economics relates to a different normative goal (which coincides with one specific notion of efficiency), emerging from different historical roots -consensus or Pareto optimality, which evolves from the Social Contract theories of the state. 37 In principle, non-teleological normative principles can also serve as normative goals for normative economic analysis.
One can describe the Law and Economics movement as comprising three generations, which can be perceived as separate sub-paradigms of sorts: the traditional 
Posner (supra note 36).
The third generation of the economic analysis of law, which can be associated with the Neo-institutional sub-paradigm, is the broadest framework of Law and Economics insofar as it incorporates institutional structures as endogenous variables within the analysis of law. 40 Thus, Neo-institutional analysis views the political structure, the bureaucratic structure, the legal institutions, and other commercial and noncommercial entities as affecting each other. Political rules intertwine with economic rules, which intertwine with contracts. 41 The tools used by the Neo-institutional law and economics are the traditional micro-economics or welfare economics models, alongside public choice, game theory, agency theory, institutional economics and Virginia Law and Economics. 42 In recent years Law and Economics has been looking in new directions. The traditional theories have been put to empirical tests, 43 and one of the results is the incorporation of studies and insights from the field of psychology and sociology regarding, among other factors, the rationality assumption, 44 behavior under risk, 45 path dependence in decision-making, the endowment effect, 46 and more. Fresh emphasis is placed to the role and function of social norms. 47 The recent emergence of Behavioral Law and economics, which focuses on the relaxation of the pure rationality assumption 48 and blends in empirical findings from the field of psychology, is bound to complicate economic analysis and push its policy recommendation still farther from those of the Chicago school. A fourth generation of Law and Economics is thus emerging.
Shortcomings and Challenges of the Economic Analysis of Law
Many points of criticism have been raised against the Law and Economics movement in general, and in particular against the Chicago school which is still its main subparadigm. In this short framework I cannot cover the wide range of critical literature so I focus on several new points, which relate mainly to the methodology of the whole project of Law and Economics, especially the challenges it faces in light of the changing world of the 21 st century.
Overemphasis on Normative Analysis and the Internal Fallacy of Law and Economics
The methodology of the science of economics is positivist in nature. As explained above, the normative goal of economic analysis is exogenous to the methodology of . 49 But lawyers attribute greater importance to normative analysis, which is the direct consequence of the nature of their occupation and discipline. When economics was imported into legal research by law professors, therefore, the emphasis was shifted to normative analysis, and the normative goal was presented as endogenous to economic analysis. This was the way in which Posner, for example, interpreted and applied the Coase theorem. 50 Within the varied normative criteria offered or employed by the economics methodology wealth maximization emerged as the dominant one in Law and Economics.
There are at least two main reasons for this, internal and external. The internal explanation is that wealth maximization is the simplest normative criterion to work with or to model. In this sense, although in theory economics (as broadly defined above) is neutral vis-a-vis the normative goal of law, in practice it is biased towards a particular ideology as the result of its easier application. Adopting wealth maximization as the prime normative goal results in preference of markets over legal ordering, privatization rather than government intervention, and total wealth rather than distributional justice. In other words, an inbuilt incoherence of the Law and Economics project as a whole is that based on the rigid pre-suppositions of the paradigm, its positive analysis cannot predict the adoption of its normative recommendations. This generates a lack of inner equilibrium between normative and positive analysis. In this sense a major difference exists between free and fully competitive economic markets and the political markets.
In the former, the conduct of individuals, each of whom is led by the self-interested goal of maximizing his or her preferences or utility, is expected to lead to efficient equilibrium, i.e. to utility maximization, creating equilibrium between positive and normative analyses. In the latter, self-interested conduct by politicians, bureaucrats and judges, which is the consequence of the very same pre-suppositions that are the bedrock of the normative goals of mainstream Law and Economics, does not necessarily lead to such efficient or utility-maximizing collective choices. In other words, once central intervention is required as a result of a market failure, the economic analysis cannot predict that this intervention will lead to the desirable solutions.
This problem of lack of equilibrium between normative and positive analysis is less acute in the realm of traditional private law and, in Calabresi and Melamed's terminology, in the realm of second-order rules designed to protect allocation of entitlements. 53 Thus if normative analysis points to the desirable rule on the leading remedy for breach of contract, or on the leading remedy for harmful activity, or to the desirable rule on contingency fees, or to any other substantive or procedural rule, there is a fair chance that legislators, who do not have direct stakes in the selected solutions, or who are not under specific pressure to enact a certain arrangement by powerful interest groups, will vote for such an arrangement. Partly, this is the result of the high degree of generality of legislation, which cannot be perceived as acting in the benefit of certain and constant individuals or groups. Likewise, a whole body of literature attempted to show why the common law -norms derived from individual precedents of courts -is geared towards efficiency. 54 Given that efficiency is the leading normative goal, this literature points to equilibrium between normative and positive analyses.
Lack of equilibrium between normative and positive analyses is a much more acute problem in the realm of public law and in the important first-order rules on to whom to allocate entitlements. When politicians vote on rules that bind their future discretion, either through the establishment of other institutions to check and balance their output (structural rules of government -either constitutional or post-constitutional) or through constitutional or administrative substantive limitations on political power, or when they are asked to vote on allocation of entitlements, it will be difficult to present their choices as conforming with normative arguments regarding separation of powers, a bill of rights or efficiency. Assuming self-interested politicians, it is not straightforward to present the positive analysis of intellectual property laws, for example, as falling in with the normative argument, which is usually used by legal theorist to describe the concept. 55 The vast majority of Law and Economics writing ignores this internal fallacy, hence loses its relevance for the practical world.
The Assumptions of Rationality and Exogenous Preferences
Just as wealth maximization has become an unquestioned component of the Law and Economics paradigm, the rigid assumptions of exogenous preferences and rational behavior are implicit in the majority of the specialized writings of Law and Economic scholars, so much so that they form part of the paradigmatic thinking. The latter usually boils down to assuming that human behavior is directed to maximizing selfwealth. Here too, the main reason for pre-assuming individual self-wealth maximizing behavior is the simplicity of modeling and applying advanced techniques of analysis, combined with the ideological belief in wealth maximization as the most desirable and prime collective goal. When wealth maximization is assumed to motivate individual conduct, the path to the collective goal of wealth maximization is straightforward (though not lacking logical and philosophical difficulties). Mainstream Law and Economics ignores the deficiencies of the shift from assuming self-maximization of utility to assuming self-maximization of wealth, for example, disregarding the decreasing marginal utility of wealth or the endowment effect. 56 The insistence of most scholars to continue the Chicago path in this realm too, therefore, makes their work of little value to the real world of law.
Likewise, the assumption of exogenous preferences, used by most Law and Economics writings, is reductionist and unrealistic, given that a number of our more important social institutions, including the law itself, are designed largely to alter preferences, not merely to structure their aggregation. 57 Ignoring this role of key social institutions such as the law, families, schools, religion and advertising, which operate largely independently of price signals and instill strong psychological aversion to stigmatized activities, decreases the attractiveness of the canonic Law and Economics literature.
Exogenous preferences are assumed by most Law and Economics writings not only because they are simpler to handle and model, but also because they are an essential component in advocating wealth maximization as the desirable normative goal.
Once one expands economic models to include the possibility of preference changes resulting, among others things, from legal rules, and takes those preference changes into account in any overall normative assessment, justification for the use of the wealth maximization criterion weakens considerably. To apply the criterion, and once central intervention by the law is justified, one must first choose whether to measure the willingness-to-pay consequences of a policy on the basis of the affected persons' pre-policy or post-policy preferences.
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Recognizing that post-policy preferences might be different from pre-policy preferences undermines the coherence of wealth maximization as pointing to a strict recommendation as to the desirable rule or legal decision, and makes wealth maximization dependent on the order of decisions. This may be one of the reasons why so far the attempts to relax the exogenous-preferences assumption, as well as the rigid-rationality assumption, for example by behavioral scholars, still remain peripheral to the core and the quantity of contributions by the Law and Economics scholars. 
The Adaptation of Law and Economics to Changing Global Environment
While the two previous sections dealt primarily with deficiencies that have 65 should be revisited. Easier and relatively cheap access to information, and lower costs of collective deliberation and action, rendered by the recent technological revolution, are likely to increase the effective monitoring level and thus reduce agency costs, thereby exerting significant influence on economic analysis of politics and on the theory of the firm. The technological revolution affects the structure and role of firms in the organization of production and the use of resources. By the Coasian analysis, firms are likely to emerge when it is more efficient to organize economic activity through hierarchies than through contracts or markets. 66 The potential reduction in the organizational cost of firms would arguably turn them into a more efficient option for conducting economic activities. Yet the reduction in transaction costs of collective action is also evident in markets, thus changing the balance between firms and markets.
If firms were conceived as the outcome of high transaction cost in markets, advanced technologies would be bound to shift activities back from firms to markets. 67 Likewise, the theory of collective action and economic analysis of the state, constitutional and public law and institutions have to be revisited. Mainstream Public Choice literature assumes that small interest groups will be able to seek rents and acquire gains through pressure on representatives at the expense of the general public.
Interest groups are able to succeed in their actions because of the costs of collective action. These costs allow only small groups to organize, whose potential gain from collective action is higher than the costs of organization. 68 This theory is decisive for the normative and positive analysis of constitutional law and state institutions. The
Internet lowers the costs of collective action, which in turn enables broader interest groups to organize, bringing more equality to the political markets and diffusing the impact of narrow interest groups; this will affect the traditional analysis of separation of powers, constitutional law and regulation. In a similar way to the discussion above, relaxing this assumption makes wealth maximization an incoherent normative criterion. Likewise, positive economic analysis is trickier because the identification of markets is less straightforward than in the old world. To sum up, the recent technological revolution and processes of globalization shake up three major features of our organization of life: the production and consumption phenomena, the state and the individual. The Law and Economics movement has not yet addressed these deep changes.
Conclusion
Law and Economics has emerged as a dominant contemporary paradigm for the analysis of law. 72 One cannot hide the fact that one of its driving forces is publication.
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Legal scholars find it easier to publish Law and Economics papers because the criteria for their evaluation are more objective and more abstract, and less contingent on local law or a specific legal system, hence they appeal to broader readership and easily cross geographical and language borders. At first sight this might not seem a justified reason for the success of Law and Economics or for its methodological dominance in the research and study of the law, but looked at more deeply this phenomenon ought to be The current dominance of Law and Economics is also manifested by its influence on non-law and economic discourse, thinking and theorizing of law. 74 Indeed, formalist, comparative, law-and-society and critical scholars have a fruitful dialogue with Law and Economics. They incorporate Law and Economics insights, way of thinking, reasoning and discourse into their writings, some of which underlie new angles of critiques that are the source for innovative non-Law and Economics insights into law.
This phenomenon contributes to legal scholarship and to better understanding and evaluation of the law.
It is time, however, for mainstream scholarship in Law and Economics, which originated in a pragmatist approach towards the law and became transformed over the years into dogmatic thinking, to return to pragmatism. Relaxing the rigid assumptions of the Chicago school, shifting the emphasis from normative to positive analysis and broadening the normative sources of Law and Economics, taking more seriously insights and methodologies from other social sciences, as well as from the humanities, and conducting more empirical work, are some of the avenues that ought to be strengthened in order to fulfill this task and stop the constant dwindling of the relevance and constructiveness of most contemporary writings in Law and Economics.
74. See, for example: Landes and Posner (supra note 8).
